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I. INTRODUCTION

Few men have virtue to withstandthe highest bidder.
-George Washington
"I don't think we ought to have 527s," commented President
George W. Bush in an August 2004 press conference.' In speaking
of 527s, Bush was referring to tax exempt groups, organized under
section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, that raise money for
political activities like issue advocacy. 2 This includes groups such
as Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, MoveOn.org, and America
Coming Together. 3 527 groups achieved notoriety during the 2004

Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President
Meets with Defense Team: Remarks by the President in Press Availability
(August 23, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/200408
23-4.html.
2. Types of Advocacy Groups, http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/types.asp
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004); I.R.C. § 527 (2004). In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court
distinguished express advocacy from issue advocacy, finding that issue
advocacy consisted of "funds spent to propagate one's views on issues without
expressly calling for a candidate's election or defeat." 424 U.S. 1, 44, 96 S. Ct.
612, 647 (1976). This is to be contrasted with the Court's view of express
advocacy, which was defined by the Court as "express terms advocat[ing] the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office, [including
ads that use terminology] such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot
for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [and] 'reject."' Id. at 44, 96
S. Ct. at 647.
3. George J. Terwilliger III & George C. Wells, CorporateDonations:527
Organizations, The National Law Journal, Sept. 13, 2004, available at
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/bbd7ce69-Of9e-4961-b055bd94c43
b8167/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/la470c97-83f9-479b-ac29c45f73e68
eb8/527%200rganizations.pdf; see MoveOn.Org: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.moveon.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (According to
their website, MoveOn.org is composed of three entities: a 501 organization, a
527 organization, and a federal Political Action Committee. The website claims
that the Political Action Committee is the only entity responsible for aiding
candidates.); see generally Types of Groups, http://www.opensecrets.org (last
visited Oct. 10, 2004) (Political Action Committees are organized for the
purpose of raising and spending money to elect and defeat candidates and are
subject to FEC regulation.
501 groups operate "for religious, charitable,
scientific or educational purposes ... [and] are not supposed to engage in any
political activities, as long as these activities do not become their primary
purpose."). The manipulation of 501 groups, as well as the commingling of the
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election cycle because of the highly controversial ads produced by
some 527 organizations.4
Although the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), which consisted of extensive campaign finance
restrictions aimed at limiting contributions of soft money, 5 was
expected by many to clean up campaigns, some third party
advocacy groups have been able to avoid being subjected to the
new finance regulations. Amounts spent on political advertising
that are not directed by, or associated with, a candidate or political
campaign are known as independent expenditures and are not
subjected to the limits passed in 2002.6 The amounts spent by 527
organizations fall under this exception as long as their efforts are
The reason these
not coordinated with political campaigns.
restrictions do not apply to 527s is because BCRA only applies to
Political committees are defined by
political committees.
BCRA's predecessor, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),
as "any committee, club, association, or other group of persons
which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000
during a calendar year or which makes expenditures aggregating in
excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." The Supreme Court has

three aforementioned types of groups is an issue that is beyond the scope of this
comment.
4. For an example of such an ad, see infra note 20.
5. The term "soft money" refers to contributions that are not subject to the
disclosure requirements of federal election laws. The Supreme Court, 2003
Term-Leading Cases, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 364 n.2 (2004).
Independent
Expenditures,
Finance
Law:
Campaign
6. The
http://www.opensecrets.org/regulation/fecplus/fecplus9.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2004). In a footnote, the Buckley Court cited a House Report and defined
independent expenditures as costs "incurred without the request or consent of a
candidate or his agent." 424 U.S. 1, 47 n. 53, 96 S. Ct. 612, 648 n. 53 (1976)
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-1239, at 6 (1974)). The Court also cited an example
from a Senate report, stating "a person might purchase billboard advertisements
endorsing a candidate. If he does so completely on his own, and not at the
request or suggestion of the candidate or his agent's [sic] that would constitute
an 'independent expenditure' on behalf of a candidate." Id. (citing S. Rep. No.
93-689, at 18 (1974)).
7. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
116 Stat. 81 (2002).
8. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2004) (A "political committee" may also be any
separate segregated fund established under 2 U.S.C. 441b(b) or any local
committee of a political party which receives contributions aggregating in
excess of $5,000 during a calendar year, or makes payments exempted from the
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stated that a group does not fall within FECA's definition of
political committee unless its "major purpose" is to influence
federal elections. 9 Even though most 527s seem to fall under this
definition, as they have over $1,000 in contributions and
influencing federal elections as their main purpose, the Federal
Election Commission has chosen not to treat 527s as political
committees. 10 The best explanation for this decision is found in
the distinction between "express advocacy" and "issue advocacy"
in Buckley v. Valeo. 1"
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court found that express advocacy
consisted of communications "that in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office
...containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat,
such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith
for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."" 2 As most ads
produced by 527s do not use these explicit words of advocacy, the
FEC has chosen to treat them as issue ads. 13 Since the FEC has
deemed 527s ads to be issue advocacy, rather than express
advocacy of a candidate, these organizations do not qualify as
political committees and are not subject to the limits imposed by
BCRA. This has allowed 527s to support a particular candidate
by simply disguising their express advocacy as issue advocacy.
This ability of 527s to engage in issue advertising is fairly
broad, as the Supreme Court has defined express advocacy
narrowly. 527s used this distinction to their advantage in the 2004
election cycle. For instance, the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth
produced an ad that featured a veteran who claimed that John
Kerry was deceitful and was openly lying about being in Cambodia

definition of contribution or expenditure aggregating in excess of $5,000 during
a calendar year or makes contributions or expenditures aggregating in excess of
$1,000 during a calendar year.); 11 CFR 100.5(a) (2003).
9. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
10. On September 14, 2004, a civil action was instituted by Representative
Christopher Shays (R-Conn.) and Representative Marty Meehan (D-Maine) in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint
alleged that the FEC failed to adequately define the term "political committee."
To view a copy of the complaint, see http://www.brook.edu/ gs/cf/headlines.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
11. 424 U.S. at 44, 79, 96 S. Ct. 612, 646-47.
12. Id.
13. See supranote 2 for the Buckley Court's definition of issue advocacy.
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in 1968.14 Although this ad focused on a particular issue, Kerry's
war record, the real purpose of the ad was clear-Vote for Bush.
MoveOn.org ran an ad alleging that Bush used family connections
to get him into the Texas National Guard, where he failed to fulfill
his obligations." Again, although the form of the ad centered on
an issue, Bush's service in the Texas National Guard, the real
message behind the ad was "Vote for Kerry."
Although 527s are billed as independent political advocacy
groups, there have been allegations that both 2004 presidential
candidates, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry,
have ties to certain 527s.16 Controversy surrounded John Kerry's
campaign when he hired Ken Exley, the director of special projects
for MoveOn.org, as director of online communications for his
campaign.17 Allegations of connections to 527s culminated in the
resignation of the Bush campaign's legal counsel, Ben Ginsberg,
after it was discovered that Ginsberg had also served as8
independent legal counsel for the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth.'
These connections suggest the real threat of 527s--that they are
merely a vehicle for doing the dirty work of the official campaigns.
527 organizations have become a strong force in the American
electoral system. These groups are able to accumulate large sums
14. Andrea Stone, Fog of War, PartisanshipCloud Kerry's Record, USA
Today, Aug. 19, 2004, at 8A, available at http://www.usatoday.comnews/
politicselections/nation/president/2004-08-19-swiftboatx.htm.
15. Mark Memmott, New Ad Accuses Bush of Allowing False Advertising,
USA Today, Aug. 16, 2004, at 10A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/politicselections/2004-08-16-ad-watch_x.htm.
16. Pete Yost, Dems See Link to Swift Boat Vets, Bush-Cheney, Chicago
Sun Times, Aug. 21, 2004, at 8A, available at http://www.suntimes
.conmoutput/elect/cst-nws-campal.html; John Mecurio, Kerry Hires Online Chief
from MoveOn, CNN, Apr. 7, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS
/04/07lkerry.exley/.
17. A statement from MoveOn.org asserted that Exley and MoveOn.org will
not have any contact throughout the election in order to avoid any appearance of
impropriety. See Mecurio, supra note 16.
18. In an August 2004 interview, White House Senior Advisor Karl Rove
admitted that Ginsberg served as legal counsel to the Swift Boat Veterans for
Truth, but denied any wrong doing, stating:
That's normal . . . . [Ginsberg is] fulfilling a legal function, not a
political [one] .... But Ben Ginsberg, who's a great friend of this
president and has been with him since he began to run for president in
1999, did-was-resigned from the Bush campaign in order to remove
any possibility of being a distraction to his friend.
See Interview with Karl Rove, White House Senior Advisor, Fox News, Aug.
26, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0%2C2933% 2C130093%2C00.html.
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of money from donors, including multi-million dollar donations
from single donors. For example, George Soros contributed over
twenty-three million dollars amongst nine 527s during the 2004
election cycle. 19 This money allows the groups to communicate
their message to massive numbers of people via large media
outlets, such as national television advertisements. These ads are
quite controversial because many of them are negative attack ads.
Some have argued that many of these advertisements contain
blatant misrepresentations and falsities, designed to 2lure
the
0
American people into voting against a particular candidate.

19. See Contributions to 527 Committees, http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/
527indivs.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 2, 2004). George Soros, born in
Hungary in 1930, made his fortune through an international investment fund that
he founded. He has recently used his wealth to make contributions to anti-Bush
527s. For more information on George Soros, see http://www.soros.org.
20. See generallyPress Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary,
President Meets with Defense Team: Remarks by the President in Press
Availability (Aug. 23, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/
08/20040823-4.html. Examples of such television ads include an ad produced
by the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, which consists of the following: an
American flag, the Jefferson Monument, and the Washington Monument flash
across the screen as a voice comments on the importance of symbols, freedom,
valor, and sacrifice. At first glance, this ad appears to be nothing more than an
attempt to stir up patriotic feelings that will raise the American morale. These
patriotic symbols quickly disappear and are replaced with dismal images of antiwar protests. Footage of John Kerry, stating that he has renounced his war
medals, is used to lead the narrator to conclude that a man who has renounced
symbols of his country cannot be trusted. Another ad features a veteran who
claims that Kerry is deceitful and is openly lying about being in Cambodia in
1968. On his website, Kerry includes a petition for visitors to sign, urging
President Bush to stop the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth from spreading
statements that have been "contradicted by official Navy Records, the New York
Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune and every man who served
under John Kerry." See Tell George Bush: Stop the Smear-Get Back to the
Issues, http://www.johnkerry.com/petition/oldtricks.php (last visited Oct. 29,
2004). Swift Boat Veterans for Truth is not the only group guilty of promoting
these attack ads. An example of a anti-Bush ad promulgated by MoveOn.org is
an ad that alleges that Bush used family connections to get him into the Texas
National Guard, where he failed to fulfill his obligations. See Memmott, supra
note 15. In response to the ad, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan
stated:
We have been on the receiving end of more than $62 million in
negative political attacks from these shadowy groups that are funded by
unregulated soft money .... [Tihe President has condemned all of the
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As a result of the prominence of these attack ads run by 527
groups during the 2004 election cycle, many have called for reform
of 527 groups. This comment examines the battle between those
who argue that restrictions on 527 groups are needed in order to
maintain integrity in the election system, and those who argue that
such restrictions would violate the right of 527 groups to exercise
their First Amendment right of free speech. Part II details the
history of campaign finance laws, with particular emphasis on the
type of restrictions on campaign finances that have been allowed
by the courts. Part II explores whether Congress has the power to
place any type of restrictions on Section 527 groups without
violating the First Amendment and concludes that Congress does
in fact have that power. Part IV analyzes several possible
limitations that Congress could implement and determines that
subjecting 527s to FEC regulation is the optimal starting point for
Congress. Although this will solve some of the problems with 527
organizations, the flood of money into politics will continue to
cause problems until more drastic steps are taken to reform
campaign finance law. One possible method for achieving this
reform is by eliminating caps on individual contributions and
implementing a system where donors' identities would not be
revealed to the candidate.
II. THE HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

A. In the Beginning: Early CampaignFinanceLaw
Campaign finance law is an area that has troubled our nation
since the early twentieth century. President Theodore Roosevelt's
a
first item of Congressional business in 1906 dealt with enacting 21
law prohibiting political contributions by corporations.
Roosevelt commented, "It is necessary that laws should be passed
to prohibit the use of corporate funds directly or indirectly for
political proposes; it is still more necessary that such laws be

ads and activity ...

by these shadowy groups .... We've called on

Senator Kerry to join us.
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Gaggle by Scott
McClellan, (Aug. 18, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/
20040818-6.html.
21. United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft, and
Agricultural Workers of America, 352 U.S. 567, 575, 77 S.Ct. 529, 533 (1957).
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thoroughly enforced. 22 This was one of the first manifestations of
what would prove to be an ongoing congressional concern with
keeping elections free from the influence of money. From 1906 to
1947, the legislation was amended several times, with each
amendment putting further restrictions on campaign finances. 23 In
1925, a comprehensive revision of the existing legislation was
accomplished with the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. The
legislative history of the Act suggests it was intended to remedy
"the evils" associated with individuals and associations making
large contributions
to political candidates in return for future
24
political favors.
Political advertising via the media has been a cause for public
concern for years. In 1940, the Hatch Act, which was designed to
eliminate the abuses in the political process that accompany the
operation of a vast civil administration, was reformed.25 The 1940
amendments to the Act put limitations on both the expenditures of
26
political committees and contributions by individuals or groups.
According to a statement by Senator John H. Bankhead II, the goal
of the Act was not only to deter politicians from rewarding large
contributors with political favors, but also to limit the sums of
money available for campaigning through the media. 27 Senator
Bankhead was concerned that large contributions enabled
politicians to spread their
28 "propaganda, both true and untrue"
through use of the media.

22. Id.
23. Bryan R. Whittaker, A Legislative Strategy Conditionedon Corruption:
Regulating Campaign Financing after McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 79 Ind. L.J. 1063, 1068 (2004).
24. United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft, and
Agricultural, Implement Workers of America, 352 U.S. at 575, 77 S. Ct. at 533.
This case involved an alleged violation of the federal Corrupt Practices Act.
The Act prohibited corporations and labor organizations from making a
"'contribution or expenditure in connection with' any election for federal
office." Id. at 568, 77 S. Ct. at 530. A labor union was charged with violating
the Act by using union dues to fund television broadcasts that endorsed certain
Congressional candidates. Id. at 584-85, 77 S. Ct. at 537-38. The Court found
that the alleged offense was within the scope of the Act and remanded the case
to the district court so that it could continue prosecution. Id. at 591, 77 S. Ct. at
541.
25. Id. at 577, 77 S. Ct. at 534.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 577-78, 77 S. Ct. at 534.
28. Id. at 578, 77 S. Ct. at 534.

20061

COMMENTS

817

B. The Enactmentof the FederalElection CampaignAct
The presidential election of 1960 also prompted calls for
Some were concerned that
reform of the election system.
presidential candidate John F. Kennedy's affluence gave him an
unfair advantage, as he had more resources available for use in his
campaign. 29 In 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA). 3° FECA limited the amount of money that
candidates could personally contribute to their campaigns, limited
required disclosure
what could be spent on media advertising, and
3
of campaign contributions and expenditures. '
Shortly after FECA took effect, news of the Watergate scandal
During the investigation, it was discovered that
surfaced. 3
between the time that FECA was enacted and the time it took
effect on April 17, 1972, President Richard Nixon had raised
33
almost twenty million dollars in unreported campaign funds.
Much of this
34 money was raised just forty-eight hours before FECA
effect.
took
This was not the end of President Nixon's campaign finance
related troubles. Two Washington Post reporters soon discovered
a secret bank account that had been set up by President Nixon's
Committee to Re-elect the President.35 This account, which was
illegal contributions
used for campaign contributions, contained
36
This
discovery led to an
bank.
a
Mexican
laundered through
more violations of
even
revealed
which
the
Committee
audit of
3
laws.
finance
campaign

29. Whittaker, supra note 23, at 1068 (citing Suzanne M. Coil, Campaign
Financing 10 (Millbrook Press 1994)).
30. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972).
31. Whittaker, supra note 23, at 1068-69 (citing Suzanne M. Coil,
Campaign Financing 12 (Millbrook Press 1994)).
32. J. Skelly Wright, Politicsand the Constitution:Is Money Speech?, in
The Constitution and Campaign Finance Reform: An Anthology 53 (Fredrick G.
Slabach ed., 1998).
33. Whittaker, supra note 23, at 1069 (citing Suzanne M. Coil, Campaign
Financing 12 (Millbrook Press 1994)).
34. Whittaker, supra note 23, at 1069 (citing Bradley A. Smith, Unfree
Speech 31-32 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001)).
35. Id. at 1070 (citing Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts:
The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law 47 (Praeger Publishers 1988)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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C. The 1974 FECA Amendments
Although President Nixon's violations of campaign finance
law, along with his ties to Watergate, ultimately led to his
resignation, his violations also prompted Senators Edward
Kennedy and Hugh Scott to put forth bills geared toward closing
holes in FECA. This resulted in the 1974 amendments to FECA. °
These amendments placed limits on the amounts that individuals
could contribute to candidates and political committees and limited
spending by candidates in federal elections. 39 The contribution
limitations included: a $1,000 limit on individuals donating to a
candidate for federal office limiting the donation of Political
Action Committees (PACs) to $5,000 per election, limiting
donations to national committees of political parties to $20,000 a
year for individuals and $15,000 a year for PACs, and an aggregate
cap of $25,000 a year on the amount an individual could contribute
to all federal candidates, national parties, and PACs. 4 1 The
limitations on exjmenditures by presidential and Congressional
candidates varied.
These limits included a $10 million cap on
spending in the presidential primaries and a $20 million cap
covering the general presidential election.43
Presidential
candidates were only able to spend $50,000 of their own money.44
One of the most widely criticized limitations was a $1,000 limit
per election on the amount that could be spent to independently
support a federal candidate. 45 The 1974 amendments also created

38. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1263 (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)).
39. Whittaker, supranote 23, at 1071 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1974), 18
U.S.C. § 608(e) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976)).
40. A Political Action Committee can be defined as "a segregated fund that
a corporation, labor union, or political organization can create to collect
voluntary contributions from individuals-but not corporate funds-and pass
them onto candidates." The Twentieth Century Fund Working Group on
Campaign Finance Litigation, Buckley Stops Here: Loosening the Judicial
Stranglehold on Campaign Finance Reform 24-25 (The Century Foundation
Press 1998).
41.

Id.

42. Id. at 25.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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the Federal Election Commission (FEC), an organization designed
to ensure that candidates complied with the new FECA rules. 46" 4
The 1974 FECA amendments were met with some resistance.47
A report from the Twentieth Century Fund Working Group on
Campaign Finance Litigation, which describes itself as a nonprofit, non-partisan fund that sponsors analyses of economic
policy, foreign affairs, and domestic political issues, argued that
Congress did not spend a sufficient amount of time ensuring that
the amendments would withstand a constitutional challenge.4a ' The
group insisted that such a challenge was sure to occur soon after
the amendments were enacted, as Congress was taking a scarcely
legislated area "involving critically important issues-like the very
health of our democracy ... [and] impos[ing] upon it a complex

tangle of regulations infused with ambiguity. ' ;49 A group of
federal candidates, political parties, and organizations that shared
this same50view challenged the 1974 FECA amendments in Buckley
v. Valeo.
D. Modem CampaignFinanceLaw
1. Buckley v. Valeo

Buckley v. Valeo,51 decided by the Supreme Court in 1976, is
the most significant decision thus far in the lineage of campaign
finance reform cases.5 2 Buckley involved a challenge to the 1974
FECA Amendments, which were designed "to purify and equalize
federal elections, [by] plac[ing] stringent limitations upon the
amounts of money that individuals were permitted to contribute
and spend upon campaigns for federal office." 53 The major issues
in Buckley that are relevant to this comment are the
constitutionality of limits on both contributions and expenditures.

Statement,
History
and
Mission
generally FEC's
46. See
http://www.fec.gov/info/mission.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
47. This resistance is exhibited by the challenge to the 1974 FECA
amendments in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976). See also Part
I.D. 1 for further discussion.
48. The Twentieth Century, supra note 40, at 25.
49. Id.
50. 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612.
51. Id.
52. Whittaker, supranote 23, at 1071.
53.

Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First

Amendment and CampaignFinanceReform, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1045, 1050 (1985).
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When examining the limits placed on contributions and
expenditures by the 1974 FECA amendments, the Court addressed
whether these limitations violated the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech. The Court made a distinction between
campaign contributions and campaign expenditures.54 Although
the Court found that both contribution and expenditure limitations
were a type of infringement on the First Amendment, it found
"expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions
on protected freedoms of political expression and association .... 55
The Buckley Court recognized that campaign contributions and
expenditures fall within "an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment activities. ' 56 It found that expenditure limitations
required the most exacting scrutiny, forcing the government to
show a substantial governmental interest.57 The interests asserted
by the government, avoiding corruption and equalizing the playing
field in order to compensate for the fact that some candidates have
mass amounts of personal wealth, did not meet the Court's
standard. 58
The Court found that the limits on campaign
54. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23, 96 S. Ct. 636. The Buckley Court found that
"by contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a
limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a
candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Id. at 20, 96 S. Ct. at
635.
55. Id. at 23, 96 S. Ct. at 636.
56. Id. at 14, 96 S. Ct. at 632.
57. In implementing this heightened scrutiny, the Buckley Court stated that
"a restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Id. at 19, 96 S. Ct. at 634.
The Court found the expenditure limit represented "substantial rather than
merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech."
Id. at 19, 96 S. Ct. at 635.
58. For the Court, preventing corruption was not enough to justify the
expenditure limits because the legislation prevented only some large
expenditures. Id. at 45, 96 S. Ct. at 647. Equalizing the financial resources of
the candidates was not a sufficient interest as the restriction
may fail to promote financial equality among candidates. A candidate
who spends less of his personal resources on his campaign may
nonetheless outspend his rival as a result of more successful
fundraising efforts. Indeed, a candidate's personal wealth may impede
his efforts to persuade others that he needs their financial contributions
or volunteer efforts to conduct an effective campaign.
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expenditures imposed "substantial and direct restrictions on the
ability of the candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in
protected political expression, restrictions that the First
Amendment cannot tolerate." 59 Thus, the limits on individual
expenditures made by candidates were struck down.6°
The Court went on to address FECA's limits on individual
contributions to political campaigns. Although the Court found
that the freedom of association was a "basic constitutional
freedom," it noted that even protected constitutional rights can be
violated if the government can demonstrate a "sufficiently
important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms." 61 The
government's stated interests were protecting against corruption,
reducing the influence of the wealthy to equalize the political
process for all candidates, and reducing the increasing cost of
62
campaigns in order to allow greater access to the political system.
The Court did not discuss the latter two interests, as it found that
reducing corruption and the appearance of corruption was 63a
sufficient reason for abridging some First Amendment rights.
The limitations that the 1974 FECA amendments placed on
individual contributions
to political campaigns were upheld by the
64
Supreme Court.

Id. at 54, 96 S. Ct. at 651. The Court also found that the First Amendment
"simply cannot tolerate § 608(a)'s restriction upon the freedom of a candidate to
speak without legislative limit on behalf of his own candidacy." Id.
59. Id. at 58-59, 96 S. Ct. at 654.
60. Id. at 58-59, 96 S. Ct. at 653-54.
61. Id. at 25, 96 S. Ct. at 638.
62. Id. at 25-26, 96 S. Ct. at 638.
63. In making this finding, the Buckley Court stated:
[C]ontribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large
campaign contributions the narrow aspect of political association where
the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified while
leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, to
associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a
limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and
committees with financial resources.
Significantly, the Act's
contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material
degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates
and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the
institutional press, candidates, and political parties.
Id. at 28-29, 96 S. Ct. at 639-40.
64. Id. at 58, 96 S. Ct. at 653.
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Buckley was a divisive case for the Court, as demonstrated by
the fact that Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices White,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, dissented in part. 65 Not all of
the members of the Court agreed with the contribution limits. In
his dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that limits on expenditures
and limits on contributions were "two sides of the same First
Amendment coin. 66 He argued that the two limits were
interrelated, as limits on contributions resulted in limits on
expenditures. 67 The idea behind this argument is that the less
money candidates receive because of contribution caps, the less
they have available to spend. In a separate dissent, Justice
Blackmun also dissented to the portion of the majority opinion that
upheld the contribution limits, finding that the Court had not 68
made
a real distinction between contribution and expenditure limits.
More recent criticism of Buckley is set forth in Justice
69
Kennedy's dissent in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.
The Nixon Court rejected a challenge to a Missouri law that limited
contributions to candidates for state office. 70 As this case occurred
before there were limits on soft money, Justice Kennedy's dissent
argued that Buckley's contribution limits were an ineffective means
to reform campaign finance laws, as they only encouraged "covert
speech funded by unlimited soft money.""
Justice Kennedy
advocated overruling Buckley in order to allow Congress and 72the
states to attempt to devise a new, more effective type of reform.
Another significant point concerning Buckley is that the Court
drew a distinction between express and issue advocacy, finding
that issue advocacy consisted of "[flunds spent to propagate one's
views on issues without expressly calling for a candidate's election
or defeat . .

. .

73 This is to be contrasted with the Court's view of

express advocacy, which was defined by the Court as "express
terms advocat[ing] the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office

. . . [including ads that use

terminology] such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot
for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [and]
65. See generallyBuckley, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976).
66. Id. at 241, 96 S.Ct. at 737.
67. Id. at 241-42, 96 S. Ct. at 737.
68. Id. at 290, 96 S. Ct. at 760.
69. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 405, 120 S.
Ct. 897, 914 (2000).
70. Id. at 377, 120 S.Ct. at 898.
71. Id. at408, 120S. Ct. at915.
72. Id. at 409-10, 120 S.Ct. at 916.
73. 424 U.S. at 44, 96 S.Ct. at 647.
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'reject.' 74 This test, referred to by some as the "magic words"
test,75 is significant as it defines express advocacy narrowly.
The policy reason for forming such a narrow definition of
express advocacy appears to be the fear of a potential chilling
effect on individual speakers and small groups. If speakers must
comply with an abundance of regulations, they will suppress their
speech because they do not have the resources to comply with the
rules. However, this broad definition has allowed groups like 527s
to run express ads that they would normally be unable to run by
disguising them as issue ads.
Recognizing this problem, the Ninth Circuit has held that
express advocacy actually encompasses more than only those
communications that contain the "magic words.' '7 6 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit realized the exact advantage that a narrow
interpretation of express advocacy would give to groups like 527s.
It found that a strict application of the "magic words" test would
leave "'independent campaign spenders'. . . just beyond the reach
of the Act [FECA] by avoiding certain key words while conveying
a message that is unmistakably directed to the election or defeat of
a named candidate. 77 Other circuits, including the most recent
federal courts of appeal's application of the test, have strictly
adhered to the Buckley "magic words" test, finding that a
communication is not express advocacy
unless it contains the
"magic words" set out in Buckley. 78

74. Id. at 44, 96 S. Ct. at 646-47.
75. See Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for Reform, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 1323, 1329 (1998).
76. In Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch,the Ninth Circuit found
that "'express advocacy' is not strictly limited to communications using certain
key phrases." It found that a "magic words" test "would preserve the First
Amendment right of unfettered expression only at the expense of eviscerating
the Federal Election Campaign Act." Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch,
807 F.2d 857, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1987).
77. Id. at 863.
78. Both the First Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have strictly applied the
Buckley "magic words" test. See Faucher v. Federal Election Commission, 928
F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that "trying to discern when issue
advocacy in a voter guide crosses the threshold and becomes express advocacy
invites just the sort of constitutional questions the Court sought to avoid in
adopting the bright-line express advocacy test in Buckley."); Federal Election
Commission v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Committee, 616
F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that "the words 'expressly advocating'
means exactly what they say.").
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The Supreme Court itself was faced with making a distinction
between express advocacy and issue advocacy in FederalElection
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life. 79 This case
involved a non-profit group's distribution of a newsletter that
urged voters to vote "pro-life" in an upcoming election. 80 The
publication contained the pictures of "pro-life" candidates. The
Court found that this was express advocacy. 8 1 After quoting the
Buckley "magic words" test, the Court held that the publication fell
within express advocacy as defined by that test, as it provided "in
effect an explicit directive: vote for these (named) candidates. 82
The Court found the fact that the message was "marginally less
direct than
'Vote for Smith' . . . [did not] change its essential
83
nature.
Although Massachusetts Citizens for Life may give the
impression the Supreme Court is willing to move away from a
strict reading of the Buckley Court's "magic words" test, more
recent federal decisions contradict this impression. Maine Right to
Life Centerv. FederalElection Commission84 involved a challenge
to 11 CFR 100.22, a regulation in which the FEC defined express
advocacy as not only ads containing the Buckley "magic words,"
but also any communication that "when taken as a whole and with
limited reference to external events, such as the proximity to the
election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as
containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more
clearly identified candidate(s) . . . .
The court interpreted
Massachusetts Citizens for Life as having adopted Buckley's
definition of express advocacy.
Although the court recognized
that an ad does not have to expressly use the words "vote for" to
indicate the desire that the candidate be elected and found this
regulation to be "a very reasonable attempt to deal with... [the]
vagaries of language," it ultimately held that the Supreme Court
drew a bright line in Buckley.87 As a result, the regulation was

79. Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. 238. 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 249, 107 S. Ct. at 623.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 914 F. Supp. 8
(D. Me. 1996).
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 11-12.

20061

COMMENTS

stuck down. 8 8 Although this opinion came from a federal district
court, it was affirmed by the First Circuit. 89 The Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 90
As a result of the conflict between the federal circuits, it is not
entirely clear if the Supreme Court intends for the Buckley Court's
"magic words" test to still be strictly applied, thus narrowly
defining express advocacy. While MassachusettsCitizensfor Life
seems to indicate that the Supreme Court may be willing to adopt a
broader definition of express advocacy, it never held that the
Buckley Court's "magic words" test should be abandoned. Nor has
the Court acted to overturn circuit court decisions like Maine
Citizensfor Life, which narrowly defined the express advocacy.
2. The BipartisanCampaignReform Act of 2002
Although there is jurisprudence interpreting Buckley, the next
major step in campaign finance law was the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). 9 1 This reform, which took effect on
November 6, 2002, was sponsored by Senators Russ Feingold and
John McCain. 92 This legislation amended FECA. Although
BCRA did raise the contribution limits set out in the 1974 FECA
amendments, the most important and well known part of BCRA is
88. Id.
89. See Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 98 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 1996).
90. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc., 522 U.S.
810, 118 S. Ct. 52 (1997).
91. There are many cases on campaign finance reform extensively citing or
interpreting Buckley v. Valet. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 103 S. Ct. 416 (1982); Buckley v. American Constitutional
Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999); Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 102 S. Ct. 434 (1981); Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 116
S. Ct. 2309 (1996); Federal Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001); Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986);
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93,
124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) (discussed infra Part II.D.3); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Board, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 120 S. Ct. 897 (2000).
92. See Whittaker, supra note 23, at 1084.
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its ban on soft money. 93 Soft money consists of contributions that
are not regulated by federal election laws. 94 BCRA prohibits
national, local, and state party committees from receiving or
spending soft money. 95 BCRA also prohibits "electioneering
communications" within sixty days before a general election. "
This includes advertisements that 97refer to a clearly identified
candidate running for federal office.
Political committees are defined by BCRA's predecessor,
FECA, as "any committee, club, association, or other group of
persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of
$1,000 during a calendar year or which makes expenditures
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." 98 In
Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that a group does not fall within
this definition of political committee unless its "major purpose" is
to influence federal elections. 99 Even though most 527s seem to
fall under this definition, as they have over $1,000 in contributions
t
as their
main puroose, the
elections
and have influencing federal527s
committees.,
as political
FEC has chosen not to treat
A concrete example of the significance of this follows. Group
A receives $200,000 of contributions in a year, which it uses to do
some advertising supporting presidential candidate Bush. These
ads include a thirty second commercial that points out Kerry's
weaknesses. At the end of the commercial the phrase "Vote for
Bush" flashes across the screen for one second. Group B also
receives $200,000 a year of contributions, which it uses for
advertising for presidential candidate Kerry. It also produces a
thirty second commercial. This commercial points out Bush's
weaknesses just as effectively as group A pointed out Kerry's
93. Id.
94. Soft money was originally excluded from campaign finance law as an
attempt to encourage "party building" activities. Though the money was
intended to be used for generic party building activities, such as "Get Out the
Vote" campaigns and generic advertisements that support party platforms but do
not endorse a specific candidate, it soon became a primary means for parties to
receive millions of dollars of contributions from affluent supporters. Cecil C.
Kuhne, HI, Restricting Political Campaign Speech: The Uneasy Legacy of
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 32 Cap. U. L. Rev. 839, 842-46 (2004).
95. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (2002).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2005); see also 11 C.F.R. 100.5(a) (2005).
99. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79, 96 S.Ct. 612, 663 (1976).
100. See discussion supraPartI.
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weaknesses, but does not explicitly say "Vote for Kerry" at the end
of the commercial. What is the distinction between these two
almost identical groups? Group A has engaged in express
advocacy. Although Group B's ad was similar, it is not express
advocacy under the Buckley "magic words" test. The FEC will not
treat Group B as a political committee, as it technically has not
engaged in express advocacy. Group A will be treated as a
political committee that must comply with all of the provisions of
BCRA. 101
3. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
BCRA had only been enacted for twenty minutes when Senator
Mitch McConnell filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality
of the law. 10 2 The Supreme Court ultimately upheld most of
BCRA, including its ban on soft money, in McConnell v. Federal
0 3
Election Commission.1
The Court found that the government had
a substantial interest in preventing corruption that was proven by
an overwhelming amount of evidence. 1°4 The Court also upheld
the limitations imposed on electioneering communications,
recognizing that the government had an interest in eliminating ads
that were designed to look like issue
10 5 ads but were actually
designed to favor a particular candidate.
Although the Court upheld the ban on soft money, Justice
Scalia issued a strong dissenting opinion. He found that limiting
the amount of money that could be contributed by third party
groups was actually a limit on the candidate's right to speech.'
Justice Scalia found that in order to make an effective
communication, it is necessary to make use of the services of
others. 107 He stated that although "[a]n author may write a novel, ....
101. See infra part II.D.4 for an example of how BCRA limits the soft money
for groups that are determined to be political committees.
102. Whittaker, supranote 23, at 1086.
103. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct.
619 (2003).
104. Id. at 118-20, 124S. Ct. at 645-46.
105. Id. at 126-29, 124 S. Ct. at 650-52.
106. Id. at 251, 124 S.Ct. at 722.
107. Id. Justice Scalia found that for a:
[Giovernment bent on suppressing speech, this mode of organization
presents opportunities: Control any cog in the machine, and you can
halt the whole apparatus. License printers, and it matters little whether
authors are still free to write. Restrict the sale of books, and it matters
little who prints them. Predictably, repressive regimes have exploited
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he will seldom publish it himself."' 10 8 If candidates are not allowed
to seek the financial assistance of others, or are limited in the
amount of assistance they can receive, this is actually a limit on the
candidate's fundamental right to free speech.109
4. The Failuresof FECA and BCRA" Usheringin a New Era
of Soft Money
Although both FECA and BCRA placed limits on campaign
finances, none of this legislation has affected 527s. Anthony
Corrado and Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institute argue that
BCRA has generally been effective, as it has accomplished its
principle goal of "prohibit[ing] elected officials and party leaders
from extracting unregulated gifts from corporations, unions[,] and
individual donors in exchange for access to[,] and influence with[,]
policymakers.""10
Nevertheless, even Corrado and Mann
recognize that the absence of regulation over 527s is a cause for
concern. In effect, the failure of regulations on 527s, along with
the limits on soft money imposed by BCRA, has led to 527s
becoming a way to circumvent the contribution caps of BCRA.
Although a person can only contribute $2,000 to a political
candidate, that same person can contribute an unlimited amount of
money to 527s. The 527 that receives the donation then uses the
contribution to support the very same political candidate to whom
the individual donor was only able to donate $2,000. Many
wealthy contributors have taken advantage of this loophole in
BCRA. The top three individual contributors to 527s donated over
fifty-five million dollars in the 2004 election cycle."'

these principles by attacking all levels of the production
dissemination of ideas.

and

Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Anthony Corrado & Thomas E. Mann, Flap over 527s Aside, McCainFeingold is Working as Planned, Roll Call, May 20, 2004, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/mann/20040520corradomann.htm.
111. See Contributions to 527 Committees: 2004 Election Cycle,
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527indivs.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 2,
2004) (these contributions include: George Soros: $23,450,000; Peter Lewis:
$22,997,220; Steven Bing: $13,852,031). For more information on George
Soros, see supranote 19. Peter Lewis is Chairman of the Board for Progressive
Insurance Corporation. Progressive: Board of Directors, http://www. progressi
e.comlInvestors/corporate-governance/board.asp#ewis.
Steven Bing runs
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III. PUTING IT ALL TOGETHER: PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH 527S
AND CONGRESS' POWER TO REGULATE THEM

A. The Birth of 527s
Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in
1975.1 12 The intent of this provision was to clarify that
contributions to political organizations and committees are not
taxable income.'i t
In 1996, the IRS announced that groups,
including those unregulated by FECA, that enage in federal issue
advocacy can register under section 527.1 4 This led to a
proliferation of 527s. 1 15 In addition, this proliferation was fueled
by the fact that the complex administrative process required to gain
tax exempt status under many provisions of the tax code was not
required of a group attempting to gain the exempt status under
section 527.116
Some suggest that section 527 was intended by Congress "to
give their own campaign committees automatic tax-exempt
status. ' 1117 Indeed, 527s originally appeared to be quite favorable
to Congress, as it allowed them to solicit funds from corporations
and labor unions that FECA prohibited the campaigns themselves
from receiving. 118 As 527s were not subjected to disclosure
requirements, they also provided a method for Congressmen to

Shangri-La Entertainment Production Company. Top Individual Contributors to
527 Committees: 2004 Election Cycle, http://www.opensecrets.org527sl27ind
ivsasp?cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
112. 88 Stat. 2108 (1975) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 527 (1994)).
113. Legislation,
Campaign
Finance Reform--Issue
Advocacy
Organizations-Congress Mandates Contribution and
Expenditure
Requirements For Section 527 Organizations--Actof July 1, 2000, Pub. L No.
106-230, 114 Stat. 447, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2209, 2210 (2001).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.atn.16.
117. James R. Sutton, Nonprofits & Politics: Issues Are OK, Candidates
Aren't, Bus. Law Today, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 59.
118. FECA prohibits corporations and labor unions from making
contributions to influence federal elections. Prohibited Contributions and
Expenditures, http://www.fec.gov//pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#anchor25790
9 (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
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allow their supporters to funnel large sums of money toward the
Congressman while remaining anonymous. 119
Congress did not anticipate 527s evolving into the creatures
that they are today. 527s were not used as much prior to 2002, as
soft money contributions to political parties and candidates were
unlimited. As a result of their status as recipients of the soft
money that can no longer be given directly to the candidates or the
political parties, 527s have gained tremendous political power.
With this new power in the form of capital, as well as their
allegedly detached position from the candidates, 527s have been
given the freedom to produce national advertisements that some
say border on the extreme. While Congress may have expected
527s to directly help their campaigns, they did not envision the
type of entity that 527s would become. Congress must now take
steps toward correcting this situation that they created.
B. The ProblemsAssociatedwith 527s
Although soft money was originally intended for get-out-thevote and party building purposes, only eight and one half cents of
every dollar of soft money was spent on one of these purposes.120
The greatest portion of the soft money dollar went toward "issue"
advertising that indirectly supported the defeat or election of a
candidate. r2 1 Although BCRA addressed this problem with regard
to most entities when it imposed limits on soft money
contributions, the limits imposed by BCRA do not affect 527s. '2
In addition, 527s may spend as much soft money as they would
like, as amounts spent on political advertising that are not directed
by or associated with a candidate or political party are known as
23
independent expenditures and are not subjected to BCRA limits.
This caused a great amount of controversy during the 2004 election
cycle because of the ways that some 527s spent the contributions
they received. There were allegations that national advertisements
119. Current law requires that 527s report all contributions over $200 and all
expenditures over $500 to the IRS. See infra Part IV.C. See also David D.
Storey, The Amendment of Section 527: Eliminating Stealth PACs and
Providing a Model for Future Campaign Finance Reform, 77 Ind. L.J. 167

(2002).
120. Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign
Finance Environment: The Meaning of BRCA and the McConnell Decision, 22

Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 235, 243 (2004).
121. Id.
122. The Campaign Finance Law, supra note 6.
123.

Id.
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produced by some 527s contained misrepresentations intended to
deceive the American people.' 2 4 A deeper problem arises from the
possibility of connections between the purportedly independent
527s and federal electoral candidates. 12 5 This suggests that the soft
money contributions that cannot be given directly to the candidate
because of BCRA limits are still being given to the candidate
indirectly through a 527 that supports the candidate.
In enacting BCRA, Congress has already recognized the need
to place restrictions on various political actors. The purpose of
BCRA was "to end large contributions from corporations, unions,
and wealthy individuals to the national parties and federal
126
officeholders, where the potential for corruption is greatest."
This same potential for corruption continues to exist with 527s.
Wealthy individuals may contribute millions of dollars to 527s,
which use the money in support of a candidate. If the candidate is
elected, the potential for political favors for the wealthy donor is
high.
Private parties have tried to influence Washington through the
use of money for a long time. 127 This has inevitably led to more
corruption than has been discovered, as it is difficult to infer
inappropriate influence from the mere fact of contributions, as
politicians will claim that they would have taken the same action
regardless of the contribution.
Nevertheless, money has been an
influence in American politics since at least the 1800s, when
Daniel Webster, who was on retainer from the Bank of United
States, used his position as Congressman to defend the bank. 129 In
the 1860s, state Senator William Marcy Tweed led a grouo of New
York legislators who "openly sold their votes for cash."' 3 A more
recent example involves the 1998 decision to expand NATO, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was founded after
World War H to establish stability in Europe.! 1 This decision was
allegedly motivated by fifty-one million dollars spent by defense
contractors, who would gain from the expansion through the sale

124.
125.
126.
127.
Wrong
128.

See sources cited supra note 20.
See supra Part I.
Holman & Claybrook, supra note 120, at 251.
Elizabeth Drew, The Corruption of American Politics: What Went
and Why 61 (Overlook Press 2000).
Ian Ayers, Should Campaign Donors Be Identified?, Regulation,

Summer 2001, at 12.
129.
130.
131.

Drew, supra note 127, at 61.
Mark Green, Selling Out 35 (ReganBooks 2002).
Drew, supranote 127, at 66.
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of weapons to new NATO members, lobbying Congress. 132 The
desire to help defense companies was evidenced by a fifteen billion
dollar fund that was set up to guarantee funds to the new members
that could not afford to buy the weapons. 33 Although these
examples do not directly demonstrate corruption in the form of
political favors, they do demonstrate the influence of money in
politics.
C. CongressionalRegulationof 527s
Quoting Senator Alan Simpson, the McConnell Court
recognized that "money is the mother's milk of politics."' 134 As
money is a vital part of politics and political campaigns, it will
inevitably continue to be a subject of controversy. A constant
battle is sure to rage on between Congress, which will enact laws
regulating campaign finances, and candidates, who will challenge
those laws and try to circumvent them.
How far can Congress go in its regulation? Although the Court
has already allowed Congress to regulate party committees, can
Congress extend its reach to regulate third party advocacy groups
such as 527 organizations? New regulations have the potential to
violate the First Amendment privilege of free speech.
Congress
must remember that its36 power has limits, which "may not be
mistaken or forgotten."'
Recognizing this warning, it is still possible that Congress has
the authority to place some type of regulation on 527s without
violating the First Amendment. Testimony given by Glenn
Maramaco, a senior attorney at the Brennan Center for Justice at
NYU School of Law, before the Committee on Ways and Means
supports the idea that even though only express advocacy groups
were subjected to the requirements of FECA by the Supreme Court
in Buckley, the Court did not intend to exempt groups such as
527s.' 37 Rather, the fear of the Buckley Court was of the chilling
132. Id. at 67.
133. Id.
134. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 149, 124 S. Ct. 619,
663 (2003) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F.Supp.2d 176,
481 (quoting declaration of former Senator Alan Simpson 10)).
135. Whittaker, supranote 23.
136. Id. at 1089 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803)).
137. Hearing Before the Ways and Means Committee on Disclosure of
PoliticalActivities of Tax Exempt Organizations, 106 th Cong. (June 20, 2000)

(Statement of Glenn Maramaco, Senior attorney of the Brennan Center for
Justice at NYU School of Law), availableat 2000 WL 897057.
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effect that could occur if groups whose main purpose was not to
influence federal elections were subjected to FECA. 138 The fear
was based on the idea that these groups would not express their
views because they were not sophisticated enough to familiarize
themselves with all of the FECA requirements, as influencing
elections was not their main purpose.
However, the Internal Revenue Code's definition of a 527
states that the main purpose of these organizations is to influence
federal elections. 527s are not the type of group that the Buckley
Court was interested in protecting. Most 527s are very large
groups, with a great amount of capital resulting from the lack of
limits on individual contributions. These groups are certainly
sophisticated enough to familiarize themselves with campaign
finance law requirements. Subjecting 527s to the requirements of
campaign finance restrictions will not cause the feared chilling
effect, diminished speech by 527s.
FECA's definition of a political committee is very similar to
the Internal Revenue Code's definition of a political organization.
Under FECA, a political committee is "any committee, club,
association, or other group of persons which . . . makes
expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar
year."' 139 Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code defines a
political organization as "a party, committee, association, fund, or
other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and
operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly
accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an
exempt function. 140 Although these definitions are very similar,
527 organizations are treated as a political organization capable of
receiving tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code
definition but are not treated as a political committee that is subject
to FECA's requirements. The FEC has chosen not to treat 527s as
political committees as a result of the distinction made between
express and issue advocacy in Buckley. 14 1 However, 527s are by
definition established to influence the election of a candidate. This

138.
139.

Id.
2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2005).

140. 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1) (2005).
141. The Buckley Court defined express advocacy as ads "that in express
terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal
office ... containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as
'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote
against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44, 96 S. Ct. 612,
646-47 (1976).
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is precisely the type of group that Buckley was attempting to
regulate. 14
When defining the term "political committees," the Buckley
Court found that in order "to fulfill the purposes of the Act [FECA]
they need only encompass organizations that are under the control
of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or
election of a candidate."' 143 The Court then found that when the
speaker is not a political candidate or a political committee, FECA
limits reached only funds used for communications that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.'A
Thus, the Court drew a distinction between express and issue
advocacy. When dealing with issue advocacy, FECA limits do not
apply.
527s have used the Buckley Court's narrow definition of
express advocacy to their advantage. By producing ads that avoid
certain key phrases, such as "vote for" and "vote against," the ad
qualifies as issue advocacy under the Buckley Court's "magic
words" test. This enables 527s to engage in express advocacy by
simply disguising their ad as issue advocacy. Although the ads
produced by 527s appear to discuss a certain issue, such as Kerry's
Vietnam service or Bush's service in the Texas National Guard,
and do not expressly tell voters to cast their ballot for or against a
certain candidate, their message is clear-do not vote for the
candidate that we are portraying badly. Conversely, by casting one
of the major presidential candidates in a bad light, the 527s are
encouraging voters to vote for the other major candidate. This
problem of allowing "independent groups" to subvert FECA "by
avoiding certain words while conveying a message that is
unmistakably directed to the election or defeat of a named
candidate," which results from a strict application of the Buckley
"magic words" test, was identified by the Ninth Circuit long before
527s become widely used during the 2004 election cycle.'
Additionally, it can be argued that the Buckley Court only
precluded some issue advocacy from being subjected to FECA
limits. Glenn Maramaco's testimony before the Committee on
Ways and Means argued that 527s groups, whose main purpose is
the nomination or election of a candidate, should be subjected to
FECA. He stated:

142.
143.
144.
145.

Holman & Claybrook, supra note 120.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79, 96 S. Ct. at 663.
Id. at 79-80, 96 S. Ct. 663-64.
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987).

20061

COMMENTS

835

The Court in Buckley could not have been more clear.
When applied to a speaker that is neither a political
candidate nor a political committee, the term "expenditure"
in section 434(e) must be narrowly construed under the
"express advocacy" standard. However, when applied to
organizations that have as a major purpose the nomination
or election of a candidate, the "express advocacy" limiting
construction simply does not apply. The activities of these
groups are, by definition, campaign related,
and
46
legitimately subject to regulation under FECA. 1
There is a strong argument that the Buckley Court intended
FECA limits to apply to 527 groups, whose main purpose is
advocating the election of a candidate. With the narrow express
advocacy provision, the Court only intended to protect
unsophisticated groups, whose main purpose was not supporting
the election of a candidate.
When addressing the limits on individual contributions, the
Buckley Court recognized the importance of protecting against
corruption in political campaigns. 147 The same reasoning applies
to the argument that the government has this same type of interest
in regulating 527s. The Buckley Court recognized the increasing
importance in political campaigns of raising money to be used for
communication with the public. 148 The Court found that "[t]o the
extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential office holders ...representative

democracy is undermined.,,' 149 Again, the argument is applicable
with regard to 527s. Given the accusations of connections between
President Bush and Senator Kerry to the 527s, there is potential for
corruption in the form of future political favors. These favors may
not only be awarded to 527 groups that promoted the candidate,
but also to the multimillion dollar individual donors to 527s. This
interest in combating corruption is very similar to the interest in
preventing corruption upon which the Buckley Court based its
decision regarding upholding contribution limits. This interest in
preventing corruption with 527s should be strong enough to
overcome any infringement of the First Amendment. There is also
146. Hearing Before the Ways and Means Committee on Disclosure of
PoliticalActivities of Tax Exempt Organizations, 106th Cong. (June 20, 2000)

availableat WL 897057 (Statement of Glenn Maramaco, Senior attorney of the
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law).
147. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28, 96 S.Ct. at 639.
148. Id. at 26, 96 S.Ct. at 638.
149. Id. at 26-27, 96 S.Ct. at 638.
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room for the government to argue that it has an interest in
equalizing the political process and reducing the increasing cost of
campaigns in order to allow more people to have access to the
political system, two arguments that the Buckley Court did not
reach.
Additionally, there is an argument that the Court itself has
recognized Congress' power to regulate 527s. In a footnote in
McConnell v. FederalElection Commission, the Court argued:
Justice Kennedy's contention that Buckley limits Congress
to regulating contributions to a candidate ignores Buckley
itself. There, we upheld FECA's $25,000 limit on
aggregate yearly contributions to candidates, political
committees, and party committees out of recognition that
FECA's $1,000 limit on candidate contributions would be
"huge
meaningless if individuals could instead make
150
contributions to the candidate's political party."'
The Court found that placing limits on outside groups was
justified, not only as a means of preventing "pass-throughs" that
attempt to avoid contribution limits, but also as a means of limiting
contributions funding "express advocacy and numerous other noncoordinated expenditures."' 51 This footnote is important because
the Court recognized the benefits of placing limits on outside
groups and limiting non-coordinated expenditures.
As a result of the similarity between FECA's definition of a
political committee and the Internal Revenue Code's definition of
a political organization, viewed in light of the type of group that
the Buckley Court was trying to protect, Congress has the power to
regulate 527s. In addition, the Supreme Court itself has recognized
the merit of regulating outside groups in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission.
IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH 527s

While Buckley has left room for the regulation of 527s by
Congress, more questions have surfaced. How much regulation
can Congress impose? What type of regulation is appropriate?
This section will consider possible regulations that Congress may
try to adopt, and address the constitutionality of each.

150. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 152, 124 S. Ct. 619,
665 (2003).
151. Id.
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A. Inactionby Congress
The first "solution" that Congress could undertake is no
solution at all. Columbia Law Professor Michael Doff advocates
this approach. 152 Doff advocates letting the supporters work it out
153
between themselves by countering each other's attacks.
Although he recognizes that there will still be misleading ads, he
advocates this approach over subjecting 527s to the FEC. 4 Doff
states:
as the speakers have to be more and more distant from the
candidates, in order to escape campaign finance regulation,
the candidates become less and less accountable for that
speech. [Thus,] the effect of closing the 527 "loophole"
could be to spur the creation of even less responsible
speakers next time around. 155
This approach is lacking because it ultimately fails to resolve
the problem of reducing the potential for corruption. 527s and
their donors may look for favors from the political candidate they
supported. The candidate may not only feel a sense of obligation
to the group, but also may award political favors to them in order
to ensure their support in the future.
This approach should not be entirely dismissed, however, as it
does have merit with regard to addressing the attack ads that have
been produced by some 527s. While there are means that could be
implemented in order to regulate the content of these ads, 156 this
152. Michael Doff, Why 527 Groups Can't Be Silenced, CNN, Aug. 31,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/31/dorf.527s/.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. One possible remedy for monitoring the allegedly false advertisements
produced by some 527s is allowing the FEC to monitor advertisements produced
by 527s. The FEC already monitors compliance with FECA. About the FEC,
http://www.fec.gov/about.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2004). An individual who
believes that a provision of FECA has been violated can send a written,
notarized complaint to the FEC's Office of General Counsel (OGC). Filing a
Complaint, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/complain.shtml (last visited
Nov. 2, 2004). Within five days after receiving the complaint, OGC sends a
copy of the complaint to the alleged violator, who has fifteen days to respond.
Id. A respondent who wants to be represented by counsel may do so by sending
the FEC a Statement of Designation of Counsel. Id. The OGC then examines
the case in order to determine whether it warrants further action. Id. Then, the
OGC recommends whether there is "reason to believe" that a violation occurred
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approach is much less of an infringement on First Amendment
rights. If one group does not like the commercial of another group,
it is free to produce its own commercial. If a group does not have
the assets to fund the production of a "counter-attack" commercial,
which is not true of most 527s, it can use the media to get its
message out. Additionally, the ads that caused such controversy
may not have had a very big impact on the outcome of the 2004
presidential election, as exit polls reveal that most people voted the
way they did because of moral values. 157 This indicates that
Americans are more likely to vote for the candidate they identify
with, regardless of whether an ad criticizes a technical aspect of the
candidate's service in Vietnam or the Texas National Guard. If
these ads are not having an impact on how voters vote, there is no
justification for abridging the right to speech. Although the
"fighting speech with speech" approach does not do much to
combat potential corruption, it serves as a solution for allegedly

false ads.

or is going to occur. Id. The decision to proceed is ultimately left to the
Commissioners, who are to consider "the respondent's reply, relevant committee
reports on the public record and the General Counsel's analyses and
recommendations." Id. If the Commission decides there is "reason to believe,"
the OGC performs an investigation. Id. The results of this investigation are put
in a brief, a copy of which is given to the respondent and the Commission. Id.
Before a copy of the brief is sent to the respondent, the respondent can request
that the matter be resolved through negotiation. Id. If the negotiations do not
resolve the matter, the respondent has fifteen days to submit a response brief.
Id. If the Commission believes that there is "probable cause to believe" that a
violation has occurred, the OGC will attempt to enter into a concilation
agreement with the violator. Id. If an agreement is not reached within nineteen
days, the FEC can file a suit in federal district court. Id. This procedure, or a
similar one, could be used by the FEC to monitor ads produced by 527s.
157. Twenty-two percent of Americans surveyed responded that they based
their vote on "moral values," followed by the economy (twenty percent),
terrorism (nineteen percent) and Iraq (fifteen percent). Will Lester, Top
Concernfor Voters May Depend on Question, Chi. Trib., Nov. 12, 2004, at 20.
It should be noted that the Pew Research Center, an independent research group
that studies opinions on politics, found that the survey may have been eschewed
by the manner that the question was asked. Id. The Pew Research Center polled
1,209 voters who said they voted in the 2004 presidential election. Id. "When
those voters were given a list, 'moral values' was the most popular choice at 27
percent." Id. However, when they were asked an open-ended question about
the top issue, Iraq was picked by twenty-seven percent and moral values tied
with terrorism at nine percent. Id.
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B. Restricting Expenditures

What if Congress was to impose a limit on the expenditures of
527s? This would be very similar to the limit on independent
expenditures that was addressed in Buckley. In Buckley, the Court
found that because this was a sizable burden this type of limitation
was subject to the "closest scrutiny.
The Court found
expenditure limits placed "substantial and direct restrictions on the
ability of the candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in
protected political expression.' 59 The government's interest in
preventing corruption in the election system, the same interest the
government could argue with regard to 527s, was found
insufficient to support an infringement of the First Amendment
right to free speech. 160 This type of limitation would most likely
be found unconstitutional for the same reasons.
Furthermore, having fewer ads would not necessarily produce
more accurate advertising, as the groups would still be able to
spend money on any type of advertising, leaving room for ads with

misrepresentations.
C. StrengtheningDisclosureRequirements on 527s

Originally, 527s were not required to report their contributions
and expenditures.' 6 1
This allowed large but controversial
contributors to hide their identities behind a 527. In 2000, Public
Law 106-230 amended section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
to require that 527s publically disclose their expenditures and
contributions.1 6 Although 527s are not currently required to
158. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,25, 96 S. Ct. 612, 637 (1976).
159. Id. at 58-59, 96 S.Ct. at 654.
160. The Buckley Court found that preventing corruption was not enough to
justify the expenditure limits because the legislation prevented only some large
expenditures. "[S]o long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,
they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his
views." Id. at 45, 96 S. Ct. at 647.
161. Recent Legislation, Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 113, at
2210-11.
162. Act of July 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-230, § 2, 114 Stat. 447, 479-82 (to
be codified at I.R.C §§ 527(j), 6104(d), 6652(c)(1)(C)). Urging the passage of
the Bill in the House, Congressman Lloyd Doggett of Texas said,
we have called on the House to come together to support in a bipartisan
fashion a cleanup of some of the worst excesses in our campaign
finance system, what one expert referred to as the most dangerous
loophole that has ever come along, period, what Senator McCain has
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report their contributors and expenditures to the FEC, 527s are
required to report this information to the IRS in the form of
periodic reports. 163
The IRS requires 527s to report all
contributions of $200 or more, as well as all expenditures of $500
or more. 164 This is the same information that political committees
must report to the FEC. 165 The only exemption to the IRS
requirement is for groups that reasonably anticipate that they will
have less than $25,000 of contributions and expenditures for the
taxable year.
This information, which includes the names and
addresses of 527 contributors, as well as the amount of the
167
contribution, is available to the public through the IRS website.
This allows the public to find the identities of those behind 527s.
As information on the contributors to 527s is already available
to the public, strengthening disclosure requirements will not have a
great impact on the problems associated with 527s. Current
disclosure requirements are fairly stringent. 527s may elect to
submit either monthly or quarterly reports during the election year,
with a special report due twelve days prior to elections.168 Forcing
527s to submit more of these disclosure reports will not aid the
American public, as most of them will not take the initiative to
investigate the donors behind 527s. Additionally, even those who
investigate may not be any more informed, for they may not know
the platforms of the contributors. As a result, even those who do
investigate 527s and their donors may not be able to judge the
reliability of the 527 advertisements.
Strengthening current

rightly called this 527 political loophole, an egregious and obscene
distortion of everything the American people believe in.
146 Cong. Rec. H5282, H5285 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Doggett). The Bill passed in the House by 385 ayes to 39 nays. 146 Cong. Rec.
H5282, H5289 (daily ed. June 27, 2000). Two days later it passed in the Senate
by 92 yeas to 6 nays. 146 Cong. Rec. S6041, S6047 (daily ed. June 29, 2000).
The President signed it into law on July 10, 2000. 146 Cong. Rec. D711 (daily
ed. July 10, 2000).
163. Internal Revenue Service: Periodic Reports, http://www.irs.gov/
charities/political/ article/0,id=152516,00.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
164. Id.
165. The FEC and Federal Campaign Finance Law Brochure: Disclosure,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Disclosure (last visited Nov.
2, 2004).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Internal Revenue Service: Form 8872 Filing Dates (2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/charities/political/article/0,,id=118832,00.html (last visited
Nov. 2, 2004).
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disclosure requirements is not an ideal solution for solving the
problems associated with 527s.
Additionally, although Buckley upheld required disclosure
provisions of the 1974 FECA amendments, questions involving the
constitutionality of required disclosure still linger as this was not a
unanimous decision by the Court. In his dissent, Chief Justice
Burger found that although preventing the appearance of
corruption was a legitimate government interest, disclosure
requirements could deter an individual from making a campaign
contribution.1 69 He found that the public's right to information
was not absolute when the information would reveal an
individual's private political convictions.1 70 Justice Burger's
dissent argued, "Secrecy, like privacy, is not per se criminal
[rather] . ..secrecy and privacy as to political preferences and
convictions are fundamental in a free society." 171 The debate over
the constitutionality of current disclosure requirements coupled
with the fact that more stringent requirements would be unlikely to
improve the system, leads to the conclusion that strengthening
disclosure requirements is not an optimal route of reform for 527s.
D. Subjecting 527s to FECRegulation
A strong argument can be made that 527s should be regulated
by the FEC. FECA's definition of a political committee is very
similar to the Internal Revenue Code's definition of a political
organization.1 72
527 organizations are treated as political
organizations capable of receiving tax exempt status under the
Internal Revenue Code but are not treated as political committees
subject to FECA's requirements. The FEC has chosen not to treat
527s as political committees as a result of the distinction between

169. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 237, 96 S.Ct. 612, 735 (1976) (Burger,
J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Under FECA, a political committee is "any committee, club,
association, or other group of persons which... makes expenditures aggregating
in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2000).
Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code defines a political organization as "a
party, committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether or not
incorporated) organized and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or
indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an
exempt function." 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1) (2000).
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express and issue advocacy in Buckley. 173 However, 527s are, by
definition, established to influence the election of a candidate.
This is precisely
the type of candidate that Buckley was attempting
74
to regulate.1
The 527 Reform Act of 2004 introduced by Sen. Joseph
Lieberman (D-Conn.) and the principal sponsors of BCRA, Sen.
Russell Feingold (D-Wisc.), Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Rep.
Martin Meehan (D-Mass.), and Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.),
would accomplish this by requiring 527s to register as political
committees, and thus be subject to regulation by the FEC . 75 The
bill, which would take effect in 2005, defines a "political
committee" as any association that receives contributions or makes
expenditures in excess of $1,000 per year and "has as its major
purpose the nomination or election of one or more candidates" for
federal office. 176 The bill also clarifies that 527 organizations have
as their major
,177 purpose "the nomination or election of one or more

candidates."
As a result, 527s would be subject to FEC
regulations. The bill contains an exemption for 527s with annual
receipts of less than $25,000.178
In introducing the bill, Senator McCain stated:
Under the new rules, at least half of the funds spent on
these voter mobilization activities by Federal political
committees would have to be hard money from their
Federal account. More importantly, the funds raised for
173. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court distinguished express advocacy from
issue advocacy, finding that issue advocacy consisted of "funds spent to
propagate one's views on issues without expressly calling for a candidate's
election or defeat." 424 U.S. 1, 44, 96 S. Ct. 612, 646 (1976). This is to be
contrasted with the Court's view of express advocacy, which was defined as
"express terms advocat[ing] the election of defeat of a clearly identified
candidate for federal office . . .[including ads that use terminology] such as
'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote
against,' 'defeat,' [and] 'reject."' Id., 96 S. Ct. at 646-47. See supra Part I for
further explanation of this topic.
174. See argument supraPart III.
175. 527 Reform Act of 2004, S.2828, 108th Cong. (2004). While this
Comment was pending publication, the 527 Reform Act of 2004, which was
introduced near the end of the 108th Congress, was reintroduced as the 527
Reform Act of 2005 to the 109th Congress. See 527 Reform Act of 2005, S.
1053, 109th Congress (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 513, 109th
Congress (2005).
176. 527 Reform Act of 2004, S.2828, 108th Cong. (2004).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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their non-federal account would have to come from
individuals and would be limited to no more than $25,000
per year per donor. Corporations and labor unions could
not contribute to these non-federal accounts. To put it in
simple terms, a George Soros could give $25,000 per year
as opposed to $10 million to finance these activities. 179
Senator McCain indicated that he was not attempting to
eliminate 527s, only to subject them to FEC regulation. 180 Senator
McCain placed the blame for the problem associated with 527s on
a failure by the FEC, before calling for an eventual complete
change in the FEC.181 For evidence of the FEC's failure, McCain
turned to the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell to argue that
"the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the FEC had 'subverted' the
law, issued regulations that 'permitted more than Congress had
ever intended,'and 'invited
' 82 widespread circumvention' of FECA's
limit on contributions.'
Although the FEC recently approved new regulations that will
require some 527s to use hard money to cover at least half of their
expenses, it also rejected two sets of proposed regulations, one
offered by the FEC General Counsel's Office and one offered by
commissioners Michael Toner and Scott Thomas, that would
subject 527s to register as political committees.1 83 These proposals
would have subjected 527s to the limits imposed
84 on all other
political committees, including contribution caps. 1
179. 150 Cong. Rec. S.9526 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
180. Senator McCain stated "our proposal will not shut down 527s, it will
simply require them to abide by the same Federal regulations every other
Federal political committee must abide by in spending money to influence
Federal elections." 150 Cong. Rec. S.9526 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement
of Sen. McCain).
181. Senator McCain found that the blame for "this continuing illegal
activity lies squarely with the FEC. This agency has a duty to issue regulations
to properly implement and enforce the nation's campaign laws and the FEC has
failed, and it has failed miserably to carry out that responsibility." 150 Cong.
Rec. S.9526 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain).
182. 150 Cong. Rec. S.9526 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
McCain) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct.
619 (2003)).
183. FEC Tightens Hard Money Allocation Requirements for Some 527s,
http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cf/headlines.htm/#20040819 (last visited Nov. 2,
2004).
184. Id.
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The 527 Reform Act of 2004 should be implemented and held
constitutional.
FECA's definition of a political committee is very similar to
the Internal Revenue Code's definition of a political organization,
yet 527 organizations are treated as political organizations capable
of receiving tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code
definition but not treated as political committees subject to
FECA's requirements. The only reason that could be found for the
FEC's refusal to treat 527s as political committees is the
distinction made between express and issue advocacy in Buckley.
But, by definition, 527s are established to influence the election of
a candidate.' 85 The Buckley Court's fear of a chilling effect does
not apply to 527s. By definition, the main purpose of 527s is
advocacy of a candidate.' 86 In addition, the majority of 527s are
not small groups with limited resources. Most 527s have an
abundance of resources, some of which could be used toward
investigating compliance with FECA regulations. The 527 Reform
Act accounts for small 527s that do not have vast resources at their
disposal by including an exemption for 527s that do not have
annual receipts over $25,000.18' 527s are precisely the type of
organization that Buckley was attempting to regulate.
Even the FEC itself has recognized the need for reform of
527s. The FEC has taken a small step toward this reform by
imposing a requirement that will cause some 527s to use hard
money to cover at least half of their expenses. However, the FEC
made a mistake in refusing to treat 527s as political committees.
The FEC has recognized that transforming the definition of a
political committee will not limit 527s much, as some 527s are
already registered as political committees. 88 Additionally, the
Commission found that the disclosure requirements that would be
imposed on 527s by the FEC are not burdensome.' 89 The
Commission also noted that there would not be expenditure limits
imposed on 527s, so the groups would still
19 be able to spend as
much money as they choose on advertising. 0
Additionally, regulation of 527s by the FEC is in line with the
Buckley Court's recognition of the importance of protecting against
185. Holman & Claybrook, supra note 120, at 247; see also argument supra
Part II.B.
186. See 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1) (2000).
187. 527 Reform Act of 2004, S. 2828, 108th Cong. (2004).
188. Political Committee Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 48 (Mar. 11, 2004).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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corruption in political campaigns.' 91 The government has this
same type of interest in regulating 527s. The Buckley Court
recognized the increasing importance of money in political
92
campaigns, as it can be used for communication with the public.'
The Court found that "to the extent that large contributions are
given to secure a political quidpro quo from current and potential
19 3
office holders, . . . representative democracy is undermined."'

The same type of argument can be made with regard to 527s.
Given the accusations of connection between both President Bush
and Senator Kerry to 527s, there is potential for corruption in the
form of future political favors. These favors may not only be
awarded to 527 groups who promoted the candidate, but also to the
multimillion dollar individual donors to 527s. This interest in
combating corruption is very similar to the interest in preventing
corruption upon which the Buckley Court based its decision
regarding upholding contribution limits. 94 This interest in
preventing corruption with 527s should be strong enough to
overcome any infringement of the First Amendment.
Subjecting 527s to FEC regulation is an optimal starting point
for Congress to remedy the problems associated with 527s. The
527 Reform Act of 2004 would limit the contributions by
individuals to $25,000 per election, thus decreasing the possibility
of corruption in the form of political favors, as there would be no
single individual investing millions of dollars in support of a
candidate. The winning candidate would be free of the pressures
of awarding favors to a person like George Soros, who contributed
over twenty-three million dollars to 527s. 195 The potential for
corruption in the form of a winning candidate awarding political
favors to corporations and labor unions that contributed money to a
527 that was favorable to the candidate would be eliminated, as the
527 Reform Act of 2004 bars any contributions to 527s by
corporations and labor unions.
V. REQUIRED ANONYMITY: THE REAL SOLUTION TO THE

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MONEY IN CAMPAIGNS?

Although the 527 Reform Act of 2004 would limit some of the
possibility for corruption through the use of 527s by limiting the
191.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,26, 96 S.Ct. 612, 638 (1976).

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Contributions to 527 Committees, http://www.opensecrets
.org/527s/527indivs.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
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amount of donations an individual could make to a candidate, the
overall problems that money causes in politics will continue. The
history of our country has shown that despite attempts for reform,
the problems associated with money in politics have persisted over
time. 196 As the tax code is amended, new sections will inevitably
leave new loopholes to be exploited. While the 527 Reform Act of
2004 may prevent individuals from using 527s to subvert
campaign finance law during the next election, lawyers will
inevitably find a new loophole to use. This is demonstrated by the
fact that the use of 527s to circumvent current campaign finance
laws grew out of BCRA, a reform measure that was supposed to
solve campaign finance problems.
In order to solve the
overarching problem, more drastic reform of campaign finance law
is necessary. One method through which this can be achieved is
by adopting a system that lifts current contribution caps imposed
on individual donors, while requiring that the identities of the
donors be hidden from the candidate. 197
One of the only campaign finance related issues that is
generally agreed upon is the belief that the identities of donors

196. See supraPart II for a history of attempts aimed at reform, along with
their failures.
197. An in depth discussion of campaign finance reform is beyond the scope
of this comment. This section is merely intended to convey to the reader that
even if the 527 Reform Act of 2004 is passed, as the Internal Revenue Code is
revised more loopholes will inevitably surface. While 527s may no longer have
the ability to influence campaigns as they did during the 2004 election cycle,
these new loopholes will leave room for new groups to form. In order to prevent
this from occurring, an overall reform of the campaign finance system is
required. While required anonymity is an interesting idea with merit, it also
raises questions. Among these are whether taking away contribution limits
would be harmful to candidates who run on a populist and working class
platform, as opposed to the candidates whose platforms favor the interests of the
wealthy who would have a limitless amount of money available. Additionally,
campaigns may disfavor required anonymity as campaigns often use the names
of past contributors to solicit future donations. Required anonymity may also
result in fewer campaigns contributions overall. As the system for donating
becomes more complex, Americans may be less likely to participate. For
instance, some Americans who have donated in the past through an internet
based donation system may decide not to donate if the new system was too
complex or time consuming. For more detailed information on required
anonymity, see Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayers, Voting with Dollars: A New
Paradigm for Campaign Finance (Yale Univ. Press 2002).

2006]

COMMENTS

847

should be disclosed. 198 But has disclosure actually helped solve
any campaign finance problems? What if we were to not only stop
requiring disclosure of contributors, but prohibit it? Bruce
Ackerman and Ian Ayers, professors at Yale Law School, advocate
this approach. 199 Although Ackerman and Ayers have worked out
this approach in intricate detail, 2°° the premise is that if candidates
do not know who made donations to their campaign, the possibility
for corruption is reduced because the candidate does not know to
whom to award political favors. 20 1 This idea is based on the
secrecy associated with the voting booth.20 2 Ballot secrecy was
adopted in order to deter corruption by making it difficult for
candidates to buy votes. 203 When the ballots were kept secret,
candidates could not be sure for whom the individual voted.
This new system would require candidates, political parties and
PACs to establish blind trust accounts at private trust companies
with substantial preexisting assets. 204 All donations would be
made by mail to the blind trust.205 Campaigns would no longer be
allowed to accept cash or checks. 206 The blind trusts would report
to candidates on a weekly basis the total amount that had been
donated to the trust, but not the identity of the donors. 20 7 Under
this system, candidates would still be able to hold large fundraising
dinners for the rich, but all the campaign could do to collect

198. Ian Ayers, Should Campaign Donors Be Identified?, Regulation,
Summer 2001, at 12.
199. See generally Ackerman & Ayers, supra note 197.
For more
information on anonymous communications, see Saul Levmore, The Anonymity
Tool, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2191, 2192 (1996) (arguing that anonymity is a useful
tool that has been ignored by Americans); Ian Ayers, Disclosure Versus
Anonymity in Campaign Finance,in Designing Democratic Institutions 19 (Ian
Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000) (arguing the advantages of anonymity
over required disclosure).
200. For more detailed information on hiding the identities of contributors,
see Ackerman & Ayers, supra note 197.
201. Id. at 6.
202. Ayers, supra note 198, at 12.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 15.
205. Id.
206. Id. Although it is not entirely clear what type of currency would be
appropriate, checks would be inappropriate, as a contributor would have access
to his cancelled check, which he could use to prove his donation to the
candidate.
207. Id.
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contributions is to send
20 8 contribution envelopes addressed to the trust
to the invited guests.
Although such a system looks good on its face, what is to stop an
individual donor from telling the candidate about his multimillion
dollar campaign2 contribution? Nothing. But as Ayers points out,
"talk is cheap." 2 9 Anyone can claim to have contributed to the
candidate, but the candidate will have no way of verifying this
information.
As seen with 527s, required disclosure has not yielded much
benefit to the American public. 210 The idea behind disclosure is that
public knowledge of political contributions will lead to the
punishment of candidates who are inappropriately influenced by
donors.2 1 It has proven very difficult to infer inappropriate influence
from the mere fact of contributions, as politicians will assert that they
would have taken the same action had it not been for the
contribution.2 12 Disclosure tends to prevent
213 only the "most egregious
and express types of influence peddling."
Anonymity gives contributors more liberty, making it less of a
First Amendment infringement. Anonymity allows contributors the
freedom to donate as much as they would like and even to tell
candidates about their donation, although the candidate has no means
of verification. Conversely, required disclosure and contribution caps
not only restrict the amount of money a donor can contribute, but also
force contributors to speak by revealing their identity. For these same
reasons, mandatory anonymity is constitutional, as it imposes less
restrictions on individuals than disclosure. As Ackerman states, the
anonymity system reflects the idea that "it's my operty and I have
the right to use it to support any candidate I want.'
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. For the shortfalls of disclosure, see Part IV.C. As an example of why
disclosure is not needed for campaign contributions, Ackerman and Ayers give
the following example:
When we are dealing with widgets, this kind of knowledge [of
disclosure] is a self-evidently good thing-if the widget producer
doesn't know who is paying for his goods, and how much money is on
the table, he won't be able to figure out whether to accept deals or
reject them. This point doesn't apply here [to campaign contributions].
A victorious politician is guilty of corruption if he delivers the goods to
his campaign contributors in too obvious a fashion.
Ackerman & Ayers, supranote 197, at 5.
211. Ayers, supranote 198, at 12.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 16.
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To ensure the integrity of this system, Ackerman and Ayers
advocate letting the FEC overlook the system with some
qualifications. 21- Before this is done, they advocate turning the FEC,
a body they criticize for its ineffectiveness,21 6 into a five-member
panel made up entirely of retirees of the judiciary. 217 These officials
be
would not be entirely free of the political process, as they would 218
appointed by the current president and confirmed by the Senate.
This system could be setup where one member's term ended every
two years, allowing a one term president only two appointees. During
their ten year term, they would have the "responsibility for making
required for the
the reilations,
the appointments, and approving
....
new paradigm.'
effective operation of the
VI. CONCLUSION

As a result of the failure by Congress and the FEC to subject 527s
to some type of regulation, these groups have become the new outlet
for soft money that can no longer be given directly to the parties or
candidates due to the restrictions in BCRA. This has increased the
power of 527s, transforming them into groups with vast amounts of
resources at their disposal. This phenomena is accompanied by a host
of problems, including allegedly false ads and an increase in the
potential for corruption. Although Congress may not have anticipated
this result when it enacted section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
in the 1970s, it must now take steps to alleviate this problem.
Although the adoption of the 527 Reform Act of 2004 is an ideal
route for beginning reformation, it will not alleviate the problem of
campaign contributions bringing about the potential for corruption. In
order to remedy this problem, reform of the campaign finance system,
not just 527s, is necessary. One possible means through which this
could be achieved is through adoption of a system that keeps donors
of campaign contributions anonymous.
Brandi CherieSablatura*
Ackerman & Ayers, supranote 197, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The author thanks Professors John M. Devlin, Paul R. Baier, and James
W. Bowers for their invaluable guidance and assistance in writing this comment.
The author would also like to thank her family members and friends for the
continuous support they provided, especially her husband Jeremiah.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

